Motion To Dismiss Appeal; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Thereof; And Declaration Of Andrew H. Wilson In Support Thereof
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY Plaintiff - Respondent v. GERALD ARMSTRONG Defendant - Appellant. |
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Court of Appeal No. A 075027 Marin County Superior Court |
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND
DECLARATION OF ANDREW H. WILSON IN SUPPORT THEREOF
ANDREW H. WILSON, SBN 053209 WILSON CAMPILONGO LLP 115 Sansome Street, Suite 400 San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 391-3900 |
ERIC M. LIEBERMAN Rabinowitz , Boudin, Standard, Krinksy & Lieberman, P.C. 740 Broadway, 5th Floor New York. NY 10003 (212) 254-1111 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CASES | Page |
Alioto Fish Co. Ltd v. Alioto (1994) 27 Cal. App.4th 1669, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 |
8 |
MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939)13 Cal. 2d 271, 89 P.2d 382 |
1,7, 8 |
Rude v. Rude (1957) 153 Cal. App.2d 243, 314 P.2d 226 |
8 |
Say & Say v. Castellano (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 88, 27 Cat. Rptr. 2d 270, 273 |
8 |
Smith v. United States 94 U.S. 97 (1876) |
7,8 |
Stone v. Bach (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 442, 145 Cal Rptr. 599 |
8 |
MISCELLANEOUS | |
Wilkin, California Procedure (3d ed. 1985) appeal § 172, p. 184 | 9 |
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CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY Plaintiff - Respondent v. GERALD ARMSTRONG Defendant - Appellant. |
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Court of Appeal No. A 075027 Marin County Superior Court |
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, AND
DECLARATION OF ANDREW H. WILSON IN SUPPORT THEREOF
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and Respondent Church of Scientology International moves this Court to dismiss the appeal of Defendant and Appellant Gerald Armstrong on the ground that he has been held to be in ongoing contempt of the very court order from which he seeks to appeal, that he is a fugitive from that court order, and that a bench warrant has been issued by the Superior Court for his arrest pursuant to the order of contempt. Pending determination of this motion, respondent seeks a temporary stay of respondent's
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obligation to file Respondent's Brief, until, if necessary, thirty days after the determination of this motion by this Court.
This motion is based upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of Andrew H. Wilson and the accompanying exhibits, and the files of record of this case, and such other and further evidence as may properly come before this Court at the hearing of this matter.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Appellate Rule 41, any showing in opposition to this motion shall be served and filed within 10 days after the service of the motion.
Dated: November 18,1997 |
Respectfully submitted, WILSON CAMPILONGO LLP RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, By: [signed] Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent |
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Respondent Church of Scientology International ("Church" or " CSI") moves to dismiss this appeal because Appellant Gerald Armstrong ("Armstrong") has willfully disobeyed the injunctive order from which he appeals and has been held in contempt for that disobedience. "A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state." MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal. 2d 271, 277, 89 P.2d 382. The court below held appellant Gerald Armstrong in contempt of court for willful violation of the permanent injunction which is the subject of this appeal and punished Armstrong by imposing a fine of $1,000.00 and a term of confinement in the County Jail for a period not to exceed 48 hours. Rather than discharging the contempt order of the Superior Court, or properly noticing a timely appeal from it, Armstrong fled the United States and is prosecuting this appeal from Canada. The appeal should therefore be dismissed.
This action arose out of numerous clear and egregious breaches by Armstrong of a settlement agreement (the " Settlement Agreement ") he entered into with the Church. In December 1986 the Church sought to end a period of long and bitter litigation with Armstrong , a former member turned professional anti-Scientologist. It paid Armstrong
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$800,000 and entered into the Settlement Agreement which required Armstrong to end his litigation against the Church, and to refrain from aiding others in litigation, to return to the Church the documents which he had stolen and all copies of them, to refrain from aiding others in litigation, to refrain from discussing with third parties his experiences with the Scientology faith, and to keep confidential all terms of the Settlement Agreement itself. Declaration of Andrew H. Wilson, ¶ 2 (hereinafter Wilson Dec., ¶ __") These provisions were necessary because, in addition to being a litigant, Armstrong had become a professional expert witness in litigation against the Church, devoting virtually all his time and energy to fomenting litigation against the Church and providing assistance to other persons litigating claims against the Church. Id
Unfortunately, the peace which the Church bargained for was short-lived. In 1990, Armstrong conveyed virtually all of his assets to his lawyer and close friends, and then began repeatedly breaching the Settlement Agreement Wilson Dec., ¶ 3. This action was filed in February 1992 in the Superior Court of Marin County (where Armstrong resided) seeking injunctive relief to prohibit further violations and damages for the violations which had occurred. Armstrong was able to delay a motion for preliminary injunction through various procedural maneuvers, including a successful motion to change venue to Los Angeles County.1 Wilson Dec., ¶ 4. In May, 1992, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Hon. Ronald Sohigian entered a preliminary injunction which prohibited further violations of these key provisions of the Settlement
1In a later about-face, Armstrong stipulated to transfer of the action back to the Marin County Superior Court where it was assigned to the Hon. Gary Thomas.
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Agreement Id. The ink was scarcely dry on Judge Sohigian's order when Armstrong declared his defiance:
A. When I mean, I have, I have absolutely no intention of honoring that settlement agreement. I
cannot. I cannot logically. I cannot ethically. I cannot morally. I cannot psychically. I cannot philosophically.
I cannot spiritually. I cannot in any way. And it is firmly my intention not to honor it.
Q. No matter what a court says?
A. No court could order it They're going to have to kill me.
Wilson Dec., ¶ 5 and Exh. A thereto.
Armstrong petitioned for a writ of mandate, which was denied and then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed Judge Sohigian, recognizing that it was quite proper to restrain ". . . Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other litigation against the Church, in violation of his own agreement." Wilson Dec. ¶ 6 and Exh. B thereto, p.10.
The Church successfully moved for summary adjudication of certain causes of action and was awarded $300,000. The Church then moved for summary adjudication of its injunctive relief claim, which was granted in October 1995. By his Order of Permanent Injunction dated October 17, 1995, the Hon. Gary Thomas found that Armstrong violated the Settlement Agreement repeatedly. Order of Permanent Injunction (Wilson Decl., Exh. C), at 2 - 6. Finding that "Defendant Armstrong has reiterated numerous times that he intends to contin[ue] breaching the [Settlement] Agreement unless he is ordered by the Court to cease and desist" and that " entry of a permanent injunction in this action is necessary . . . because pecuniary compensation could not afford the Church adequate relief" (Id. at 6), Judge Thomas issued an Order
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of Permanent Injunction enjoining further violations. Id. at 7-8. Armstrong then declared bankruptcy and contended that not only was the damage award discharged, but also that he was discharged from all obligations under the Settlement Agreement, including those which prohibited his voluntary intermeddling in litigation against the Church. The Church was required to bring an adversary proceeding in which it established that these obligations were not discharged. Wilson Dec., ¶ 9.
Armstrong's violations of the Settlement Agreement and the Permanent Injunction persisted. On January 26,1992, Armstrong submitted a 45-page declaration against the Religious Technology Center ("RTC") one of the named Beneficiaries of the Settlement Agreement directly to the Hon. Ronald M. Whyte of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, who was presiding over a copyright infringement case brought by RTC. The declaration was not properly filed with the Court, although Armstrong gratuitously "served" it on all parties. The goal of of this transparent subterfuge was to make the declaration widely available. Wilson Dec., ¶11.2 On July 5, 1997, Judge Thomas held Armstrong in contempt of court for this egregious conduct, stating:
ARMSTRONG willfully disobeyed the Order [of Permanent Injunction]. On or about January 26, 1997,
2Armstrong had been only recently warned. Armstrong previously violated the Permanent Injunction when on October 7,1996, he wrote a long letter to the Los Angeles City Council opposing the naming of a city street after L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology. He then made the letter available for posting on the Internet. The Church did not seek an order of contempt for this violation, but instead turned the other cheek and simply warned Armstrong by letter not to commit further violations. The Church's restraint was rewarded by Armstrong's direct submission of the declaration to Judge Whyte. Wilson Dec., ¶¶ 10-11
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ARMSTRONG sent a document entitled DECLARATION OF GERALD ARMSTRONG to United States District Judge Ronald M. Whyte. Judge Whyte was at the time presiding over three cases in which the plaintiff is RTC [one of the Scientology related entities against which Armstrong had agreed not to assist litigants and which was covered by the Permanent Injunction]. In the declaration, ARMSTRONG recites his understanding that he was prohibited from sending such a Declaration directly to litigants and states that he is instead sending it directly to Judge Whyte in the hopes of influencing his decision on a pending matter. This evidences ARMSTRONG's willful disobedience of the Order and Judgment.
Order of Contempt (Wilson Dec., ¶ 12, Exh. F).
Judge Thomas then found that "GERALD ARMSTRONG is guilty of Contempt of Court for failure to obey the Order and Judgment" Id. and noted, "the Order was valid and enforceable; ARMSTRONG had knowledge of the Order, and had the ability to comply with the Order and willfully disobeyed the Order." Id. Armstrong was ordered punished for contempt by a fine of $1,000 and forty-eight hours confinement in the county jail. Id. at 3. Armstrong did not appeal the Order of Contempt and the time for filing a notice of appeal of that Order has passed.
Rather, in the face of the Order of Contempt, Armstrong fled the United States. He has not paid the $1,000 fine and he has not submitted to confinement in the county jail. Wilson Dec., ¶ 13. A Beach Warrant issued by Judge Thomas on August 6,1997 is still outstanding. Beach Warrant, Wilson Dec., Id. Indeed, Armstrong continued to defy the Order of Permanent Injunction even after he was found in contempt by the Superior Court. On October 28, 1997, the German television service broadcast an
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interview with Armstrong in which he repeatedly violated the Order of Permanent Injunction. Wilson Decl. I, ¶ 14.
Armstrong's defance continues before this Court, In his Opening Brief, he boldly reaffirms his refusal to abide by the court's lawful orders and declares (speaking of himself in the third person), "he cannot be silenced by the obstructive [Settlement Agreement], nor by the Marin Court's enforcement." Appellant's Opening Brief at 41. 3
Armstrong's appeal should be dismissed because he has refused to comply with the order of the Superior Court in this action. As a contemnor, and now a fugitive, he may not proceed with his appeal. Moreover, while Armstrong cannot be bothered by compliance with the orders of the Superior Court, he is nonetheless willing to place the massive imposition of this appeal on respondent and this Court. The record on this appeal is extensive as evidenced by Armstrong's designation of 224 exhibits, amounting to many thousands of pages, for inclusion in the Clerk's Transcript.4 Rather than engage in an unnecessary and unwarranted review of the Superior Court's order (which review would only demonstrate Armstrong's refusal to comply with his own agreement and the Court's orders), this Court should follow established precedent and dismiss Armstrong's
3 Armstrong's Opening Brief is dated August 25, 1997, less than three weeks after the issuance of the Beach Warrant. The brief was mailed from " Chilliwack, B.C., Canada" and Armstrong does not provide his address, but rather it is "care of" someone else. Appellant's Opening Brief, cover and Proof of Service.
4In his Opening Brief, Armstrong states that he "has no present access to published California and U.S. law and appellate opinions." Appellant's Opening Brief at 3. Presumably, this is due to his own decision to flee the country.
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appeal because he is in open and continuing contempt of the Superior Court order he seeks to challenge.
The Supreme Court of California held in MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal. 2d 271,. 89 P.2d 382, that a father who had fled California to Mexico with his children in violation of the custody arrangements made in his divorce agreement and ordered by the court thereby forfeited his right to appeal the court's order of fees against him in the action. The Court stated:
In secluding the children in a foreign country and alienating them, appellant violated not only his agreement with plaintiff and the provisions of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce, but he has also wilfully and purposely evaded legal processes and contumaciously defied and nullified every attempt to enforce the judgments and orders of the California courts, including the very order from which he seeks relief by this
appeal. Such flagrant disobedience and contempt effectually bar him from receiving the assistance of an appellate tribunal. A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.
Id. at 277.
Armstrong cannot proceed with his appeal to test the validity of the Permanent Injunction. The law does not give him the right to decide for himself whether or not he will abide by the orders of the courts. As the United States Supreme Court held in an appeal brought by an escaped convict, "If we affirm the judgment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his sentence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he will appear or not, as he may consider most for his interest. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to hear and decide what may prove to be only a moot case." Smith v. United States , 94 U.S. 97 (1876). As stated by the California Supreme Court in MacPherson,
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"until that contempt is purged appellant is not entitled to a hearing before an appellate tribunal." 13 Cal. 2d at 279.
The "disentitlement doctrine" established by MacPherson has been routinely applied to bar litigants such as Armstrong who are in contempt of court from prosecuting their appeal. See Alioto Fish Co. Ltd v. Alioto (1994) 27 Cal. App.4th 1669, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 244, 250-51 ("Although the power to stay or dismiss an appeal is typically exercised when the litigant is formally adjudicated in contempt of count, 'the same principle applies to wilful disobedience or obstructive tactics without such an adjudication'") (quoting 9 Witkin Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 172, p.184); Say & Say v. Castellano (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 95, 27 Cal. Rptr.2d 270, 273 ("It is well established that an appellate court may stay or dismiss an appeal by a party who has refused to obey the superior court's legal orders"); Stone v. Bach (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 442, 145 Cal. Rptr. 599 (appeal of accounting proceeding dismissed where appellant was found in contempt for failing to deposit monies ordered paid into court). The language and reasoning of Rude v. Rude (1957)153 Cal. App.2d 243, 314 P.2d 226 when it dismissed the appeal of a contumacious husband, is remarkably similar to that of the Supreme Court in Smith: "The husband's attitude seems to be that if this case is decided in his favor it will be quite all right, but if it is not so decided he will be out of reach of the court, so that no matter what is done or what decision is made, he will continue to do just as he has done in the past, namely pay no attention whatsoever to any order of any court in California insofar as complying with any such order is concerned." This case is virtually on all fours with Smith and Rude. Armstrong urges the Court to
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reverse the decision below, but if it does not, he will be out of reach of the court and will continue, as he has in the past, to willfully defy valid court orders.
Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other litigation against the Church and numerous other clear violations of the Settlement Agreement led to the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Sohigian. Armstrong defied the preliminary injunction though it was upheld on appeal. Judge Thomas issued a permanent injunction which Armstrong unsuccessfully tried to avoid through filing bankruptcy. He then repeatedly violated the permanent injunction and was held in contempt for doing do. Rather than discharge the contempt, he fled the jurisdiction. He now prosecutes this appeal apparently from Canada and, while still in contempt, travels to Germany to commit further violations of the permanent injunction from which he appeals.
Armstrong's appeal should be dismissed now because he has been held in contempt for his willful defiance of the order and judgment from which he appeals. Determination of this motion to dismiss requires only reference to the Declaration of Andrew H. Wilson, and the accompanying exhibits including the Order of Permanent Injunction, the Order of Contempt, and the Bench Warrant. As the appeal is readily resolved without reference to the merits of the action and simply by review of these few enumerated documents, thereby obviating the need of the Respondent and this Court to
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review and digest the extensive record, it should be granted in the interests of judicial economy.5
Dated: November 18,1997 | WILSON CAMPILONGO LLP RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent |
5Respondent further requests that its time to respond to Appellant's Opening Brief be stayed pending determination of this Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Appeal. If necessary upon determination of the motion, Respondent further requests an additional stay of thirty days from the date of determination of the motion to file its answering brief.
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DECLARATION OF ANDREW H. WILSON IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
ANDREW H. WILSON deposes and says:
1. I am a partner in the law firm of Wilson Campilongo LLP and am an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of California. I was the attorney principally responsible for the representation of the Plaintiff and Appellant, Church of Scientology International (the "Church or CSI") and was lead counsel for CSI in the litigation of this matter at the superior court level. As such I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth below and, if called upon to testify on such matters, would and could do so competently.
2. In December 1986 the Church entered a settlement (the Settlement Agreement") with Gerald Armstrong. This settlement was part of a settlement of a number of lawsuits, which included litigation between the Church and Armstrong. Armstrong was the "lead" plaintiff, and all plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney. Armstrong was also the principal witness for the other plaintiffs, as a self-proclaimed expert on the workings and management of the Church. In settling this litigation, it was the Church's desire to end its relationship with Armstrong once and for all. In order to accomplish this, the Church insisted on the following covenants by Armstrong: (i) Armstrong's agreement to end his active and voluntary support to anti-Scientology litigants which he had been voluntarily providing in the form of purported expert declarations and testimony for the preceding several years, (ii)
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Armstrong's agreement to return to the Church documents which he had stolen and all copies of them and (iii) Armstrong's agreement to refrain from discussing with third parties his experiences with the Scientology religion and to keep confidential all terms of the settlement itself. In exchange., and as his part of the overall settlement, Armstrong received $800,000.
3. Armstrong, however, quickly betrayed his agreement. In 1990 he conveyed to his friends and attorney virtually all of his assets, including an expensive house which he had built in Marin County with proceeds from his settlement with the Church. Then he resumed voluntary and active litigation support in direct violation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and began making and publicizing statements of his purported experiences in and knowledge of the Church.
4. CSI filed the action underlying this appeal in Marin County Superior court in February 1992 (where Armstrong resided). The complaint sought injunctive relief to prohibit Armstrong from committing further violations of the Settlement Agreement and also liquidated damages for the violations which Armstrong had already committed. The Church rapidly obtained a Temporary Restraining Order, compelling Armstrong to adhere to the Settlement Agreement but Armstrong was able to delay the motion for preliminary injunction through various procedural maneuvers, including a motion to change venue to Los Angeles County. In May, 1992, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, the Hon. Ronald Sohigian entered a preliminary injunction which prohibited Armstrong from further violations of the key provisions of the settlement agreement.
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5. In June, 1992 I took Armstrong's deposition in this case. During the deposition, in the face of Armstrong's assertions that he did not consider himself restrained in any way by the contract which he had entered with CSI in 1986, I questioned him as to whether he intended to obey the order of Judge Sohigan. Armstrong responded:
A. When I mean, I have, I have absolutely no intention of honoring that settlement agreement. I cannot. I cannot logically, I cannot ethically. I cannot morally. I cannot psychically. I cannot philosophically. I cannot spiritually. I cannot in any way. And it is firmly my intention not to honor it.
Q. No matter what a court says?
A. No court could order it. They're going to have to kill me.
A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of that deposition are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit [A].
6. Armstrong sought review of the preliminary injunction by writ of mandate which was denied on November 20, 1992 and then prosecuted an interlocutory appeal. On May 16, 1994, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction by its unpublished opinion of that date, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit [B].
7. True to his challenge to the order of the Court and his avowal to disregard his contractual obligations, Armstrong continued to engage in breaches of the terms of settlement arid of the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Sohigan. CSI responded by amending its complaint several times in order to incorporate these new breaches. After Armstrong stipulated to a transfer of the action back to Marin
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County where it had originally been brought and where Armstrong had resided throughout the case, the Church then brought and won a series of summary adjudication motions on specific breaches, ultimately being awarded a total of $300,000 in liquidated damages. CSI filed and won a motion for summary adjudication on its claim for a permanent injunction. Further, on summary adjudication the Church obtained the dismissal of Armstrong's cross-complaint attacking the validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement and also obtained the dismissal of Armstrong's affirmative defenses. Judge Gary H. Thomas entered a detailed, carefully crafted Order of Permanent Injunction of October 17, 1995 and entered Judgment in the breach of contract case on May 2, 1996.
8. In his Order of permanent injunction, Judge Thomas enumerated 31 breaches of the settlement agreement by Armstrong in the period from 1991 to 1995. A true and correct copy of the Order of Permanent Injunction and the subsequent Judgment attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit [C]. After devoting five pages to the itemization of Armstrong's breaches of the agreement -- all of which were carried out in violation of Judge Sohigian's preliminary injunction -- the Court recognized the futility of attempting to bring Armstrong into compliance with his settlement contract through the imposition of a monetary sanction and noted the need for a court order to compel Armstrong's compliance:
Defendant Armstrong has reiterated numerous times that he intends to continue breaching the Agreement unless he is ordered by the Court to cease and desist.
Accordingly, the Court finds that entry of a permanent injunction in this action is necessary in this action
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because pecuniary compensation could not afford the Church adequate relief, and the restrain is necessary in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions for breach of contract.
Exh.C, 6:18-20, 24-27)
9. Armstrong's immediate response to the award of $300,000 in liquidated damages to CSI and to the issuance of the Order of Permanent Injunction was to file for bankruptcy and request that the bankruptcy court discharge this debt and the injunction. CSI brought an adversary complaint in opposition. After a one-day trial, the Hon. Alan Jaroslovsky, of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Santa Rosa Division discharged Armstrong's monetary debt but left whole the Order of Permanent Injunction.
10. Unfortunately Armstrong, has chosen to ignore this Order of Permanent Injunction of the Marin County Superior Court, just as he earlier had ignored the Order of Preliminary Injunction of the Los Angeles Superior Court. On October 7, 1996 Armstrong sent a letter to the Los Angeles City Council, which at the time was considering the renaming of a city street in honor of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Scientology religion. Armstrong's letter (which evidently had no impact on the City Council as they ruled virtually unanimously to approve the street name change) was a direct and flagrant breach of both the 1986 settlement agreement and 1995 Order of Permanent Injunction. Armstrong compounded this violation by having his letter posted on the Internet. A true and correct copy of the Internet posting of Armstrong's letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit [D]. In response to this violation, I sent Armstrong a letter warning him
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that such actions constituted a violation of Judge Thomas' order and that " further violations of the Order will only serve to exacerbate and compound the seriousness of this matter." A true and correct copy of my latter of october 23, 1996 to Armstrong is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit [E].
11. Unrestrained, Armstrong again violated the Marin Court's Order. This time, on January 26, 1994, Armstrong submitted a 45 page declaration against the Religious Technology Center ("RTC"), one of the named beneficiaries of the 1986 Settlement Agreement. He sent this declaration, containing material directly violating the agreement and Order, to the Hon. Ronald M. Whyte, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, who was presiding over several copyright infringement cases brought by RTC. Armstrong's declaration was rejected by the court as improperly submitted. Nevertheless, since this was a further and egregious violation of the Order of Permanent Injunction, CSI concluded that Armstrong's actions must be brought to the attention of Judge Thomas. Accordingly, CSI moved for an Order to Show Cause why Armstrong should not be held in contempt of court for his actions. Rather than responding to the OSC Armstrong fled the country, moving to Canada where, to the best of my knowledge, he currently .resides. Armstrong's flight required that we serve tire Order to Show Cause by publication.
12. Judge Thomas reviewed the evidence and found Armstrong in contempt of court. On July 5, 1997 he issued an Order of Contempt which states, in part:
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ARMSTRONG willfully disobeyed the Order [of Permanent Injunction]. On or about January 26, 1997
ARMSTRONG sent a document entitled DECLARATION OF GERALD ARMSTRONG to the United States District Judge Ronald M. Whyte. Judge Whyte was at the time presiding ever three cases in which the plaintiff is RTC. In the Declaration, ARMSTRONG recites his understanding that he was prohibited from sending such a Declaration directly to litigants and states that he is instead sending it directly to Judge Whyte in the hopes of influencing his decision on a pending matter. This evidences ARMSTRONG's willful disobedience of the Order and Judgment."
(A true and correct copy of said order is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit [F]) In finding Armstrong guilty of Contempt of Court, the Marin Court noted that "the Order was valid and enforceable; ARMSTRONG had knowledge of the Order, and had the ability to comply with the Order and willfully disobeyed the Order." (Id. )
13. The Court sentenced Armstrong to a $1,000 fine and 48 hours confinement in the county jail. (Id.) Armstrong did not appeal the Order of Contempt and the time for filing a notice of appeal has passed. On August 6, 1997 Judge Thomas issued a Bench Warrant for Armstrong's arrest, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit [G]. The Warrant is still outstanding and Armstrong has not appeared to satisfy the terms of the Order of Contempt.
14. Further, despite the Order of Permanent Injunction, despite the Order of Contempt, and despite the Bench Warrant, from his refuge in Canada, Armstrong has continued to flagrantly violate the order of the Marin Court and ignore his contractual duties to the Church per his 1986 settlement. On October 28, 1997
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Armstrong appeared on a German television broadcast for which he had given an extensive interview, discussing matters at length which constituted repeated violations of the Order of Permanent Injunction. I have viewed a videotape of this broadcast and have personally observed Armstrong's numerous statements in violation of that Order. The videotape is not made part of the record at this time in order not to burden the court. The videotape and/or a transcript, can be provided promptly if necessary.
I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 18th day of November, 1997
[signed]
ANDREW H. WILSON
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See also: Armstrong Declaration in Support of Opposition to Plaintiff/Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
Exhibit [A]
Armstrong Deposition Excerpt [.pdf] 06-24-1992
Exhibit [B]
Unpublished opinion Court of Appeal 05-16-1994
Exhibit [C]
a) Injunction
b) Judgment
Exhibit [D]
Armstrong Letter to Los Angeles City Council 10-7-1996
Exhibit [E]
Wilson Letter to Armstrong 10-23-1996
Exhibit [F]
Order of Contempt 07-05-1997
Exhibit [G]
Bench Warrant 08-06-1997