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Andrew H. Wilson, SBN 063209 WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO 115 Sansome Street Fourth Floor San Francisco, California 94104 (415) 391- 3900 Telefax: (415) 954-0938 Laurie J. Bartilson, SBN 139220 MOXON & BARTILSON 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000 Hollywood, CA 90028 (213) 960-1936 Telefax: (213) 953-3351 Attorneys for Plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

[stamp] FILED OCT 17 1995 HOWARD HANSON MARIN COUNTY CLERK by J. Steele, Deputy [signed] JSteele

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN

CHURCH of SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit religious corporation, Plaintiff, vs. GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants.

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CASE NO. BC 157680 [Handwritten] GWT 10/17/95 [PROPOSED] ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE THIRTEENTH, SIXTEENTH, SEVENTEENTH, AND NINETEENTH CAUSES OF ACTION DATE: October 6, 1995 TIME: 9:00 a.m. DEPT: 1 TRIAL DATE: Vacated

This matter came on for hearing on October 6, 1995, on motion of plaintiff Church of Scientology International ("the Church") for Summary Adjudication of the Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Causes of Action of the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff Church of Scientology International

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appeared by its attorneys, Andrew H. Wilson of Wilson, Ryan & Campilongo and Laurie J. Bartilson of Bowles & Moxon, defendant Armstrong appeared by his attorney, Ford Greene. Having read and considered the moving and opposing papers, and the evidence and arguments presented therein and at the hearing, and good cause appearing:

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Motion of Plaintiff for Summary Adjudication of Issues as to the Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Causes of Action of the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiff, Church of Scientology International, and against Defendant, Gerald Armstrong, in the amount of $200,000.

Plaintiff has met its burden of showing that defendant breached the settlement agreement and that it is entitled to liquidated damages of $50,000 for each breach. Defendant has failed to raise a triable issue as to any of the causes of action, as follows:

INVALIDITY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISION: Defendant's evidence regarding his attorneys' failure to represent his interests (see Facts 43 and 68) is hearsay and/or not based on personal knowledge. The opinion of defendant's attorney as to the validity of the provision (see, e.g., Facts 52-54, 57-60) is irrelevant and hearsay. The fact that two other clients signed a settlement agreement containing the same liquidated damages amount (see Facts 55-56 and 63-64) does not raise an inference that the provision was unreasonable. Defendant's evidence is insufficient to raise a reasonable inference of unequal

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bargaining power (no personal knowledge shown that plaintiff, as opposed to Flynn, positioned defendant as a "deal breaker"; Flynn's statements hearsay; no personal knowledge shown of plaintiff's wealth; wealth alone does not raise inference of unequal bargaining power since no showing defendant desperate for money and had to accept on plaintiff's terms). Defendant's evidence does not raise an inference that plaintiff's calculation is "unfathomable" (Fourteenth Cause of Action seeks $50,000 for each of 18 letters; Nineteenth Cause of Action is based only on declarations, not on other contacts between defendant and attorney/other clients). Defendant fails to establish how he knows plaintiff had not been injured by his statements at the time of settlement.

DURESS: Flynn's statements to defendant are hearsay. (See, e.g., D's Facts 1C and 1D.) Further, defendant has not shown that plaintiff was aware of Flynn's purported duress of defendant. (See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 206.) Contrary to defendant's statement about duress, "careful weighing of options" is completely inconsistent with an absence "of the free exercise of his will power" or his having "no reasonable alternative to succumbing:" (See Philippine Expert & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Ca1.App.3D 1058, 1078; In Re Marriage of Baltins (1989) 27.2 Cal.App.3D 66, 84.)

FRAUD: Flynn's statements to defendant (see Fact 78) are hearsay. The Court finds that the portions of the agreement cited by defendant (see Facts 79 and 80) do not establish a mutual confidentiality requirement. Paragraph 7(I) only prohibits the parties from disclosing information in litigation

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between the parties; paragraph 18 (D) only prohibits disclosure of the terms of the settlement; defendant has not shown that plaintiff did either of those things. Further, "[something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's intention not to perform his promise." (Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30-31).

NO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED COVENANT: Defendant relies on the purported mutuality requirement, which he has failed to establish.

FIRST AMENDMENT: First Amendment rights may be waived by contract. (See ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3D 307, 319.)

2. The plaintiff has asked that the exhibits which were previously ordered sealed be stricken as they are trade secrets, irrelevant to this motion. This request is GRANTED. They are not relevant. Further, they were filed by Mr. Armstrong in pro per when he is, in fact, represented by counsel.

Dated: October 17, 1995

[signed] Gary W. Thomas GARY W. THOMAS Judge of the Superior Court

Approved as to form:
_________________________
Ford Greene
Attorney for Defendants Gerald Armstrong and the Gerald Armstrong Corporation