February 27, 1991
Office of the Clerk
Court of Appeal for the State
300 South Spring Street, Room 228
Los Angeles, CA 90013
Re: Church of Scientology of California and Mary Sue
Hubbard, Appellants, v. Gerald Armstrong, Defendant;
Bent Corydon, Appellee. Civ. No. B 038975
Dear Sir or Madam:
Defendant Gerald Armstrong requests that you bring this
attention of the judges who heard this appeal on February 24, 1991.
During oral argument defendant provided incomplete
citations for two
cases which acknowledge appellant organization's policy of "fair
complete citations are Allard v. Church of Scientology (1976 58 Cal. App. 3d
439, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, and Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of
California (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 872, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331.
On February 26, 1991 defendant received a letter brief
February 19 which appellants provided the court prior to the February 20
oral argument, but which defendant did not know of until February 21 and
did not read until February 26. Attached hereto as Exhibit
[A] is a copy of the
envelope which captained this letter brief showing that it was mailed to
defendant on February 22, 1991. Since defendant was denied the
opportunity at oral argument to respond to any of the statements made by
appellants in their letter brief, he respectfully requests to be allowed to do
Appellants state that their reason for filing their
they did was because no provision was made for them to respond to
defendant's brief filed December 31, 1990. Rule 16 of the California Rules of
Court, however, requires that appellants' reply brief be filed within 20 days
of filing of respondent's brief; i.e., by January 20, 1991. By delaying the
filing of their reply brief until the day before the scheduled oral argument
and not serving the reply brief on defendant until after oral argument
appellants have landed a punch after the bell and should have a point taken
away; or in this case their reply letter brief should be accepted as another
instance of their jurisprudential chicanery.
Appellants have asked that the materials contained in
appendix be disregarded, claiming they are not part of the record on this
appeal. Of the 388 pages, however, 26 1 pages are documents from the court
file appellants are attempting to keep sealed, and 29 pages are documents
already filed at other times in this appeal before this court. The remaining
98 pages are documents which relate directly to the issue of unsealing the
trial court's file, and which defendant included too assist this court in its
decision making process.
Since appellants have offered their own description of
the court file in support of their arguments to keep the file sealed, it is
completely proper for defendant to describe the file contents, and include in
his appendix documents from the file to demonstrate that they are
completely different from appellants' description.
Regarding the document entitled Response of Gerald
Opposition Filed By Real Party In Interest Bent Corydon filed by defendant's
attorney in this appeal on December 28, 1988, defendant has already stated
the facts and his position in his pleading filed in this appeal entitled
Defendant's Reply To Appellants' Opposition To Petition For Permission To
File Response and For Time To File, Defendant's Appendix (DA)at 44. When
told by his attorney that appellant organization wanted him to file a
document to keep the court file sealed defendant refused. Only in November
1989 did defendant learn that his attorney had filed the December 28, 1988
response "on his behalf", and that the Division Four Court had denied it.
No matter how appellants contrive it, sealing the court file was not
and is not an integral , indispensable part of the settlement. Defendant was
remunerated for his release of the claims of his cross-complaint prior to trial.
The settlement can stand with or without the sealing of the file. Appellants,
however, have acted since the settlement in ways which make tile continued
sealing of the file an obstruction of justice. Defendant does not contest the
settlement; he contests the conditions of the settlement which are against
public policy and call for him to obstruct justice, and he contests the threats
and attacks on him by appellant organization following the settlement.
Appellants' complaining that defendant has suggested that
settlement agreement imposed a confidentiality requirement on appellant
organization is deceptive bullet-dodging. It is appellants who maintained
that the confidentiality requirement applied to them as well as defendant,
DA at 6, Ex. D to the March 15, 1990 Declaration. Only when confronted with
their violations of this position did appellants shift to their present position
where they claim only defendant is bound by the confidentiality
requirement while they are free to say and file whatever they want about
him. Such a position is acceptable and reasonable,of course, as long as
neither party said or filed anything about the other. As soon as appellants
said or filed anything about defendant they freed him from the
confidentiality requirement since their act was post-settlement, he had
released them from their acts only up to the date of the settlement, and he
had a right to defend himself. Appellants' interpretation of the settlement
agreement's confidentiality requirement turns defendant into a defenseless
punching bag, which is pleasing to them, but an unacceptable concept in our
system of justice.
Concerning any other matters in appellants' letter brief,
relies on his brief and related documents and the briefs of appellee Bent
Corydon filed in this appeal.
Very truly yours,
[signed] Gerald Armstrong
P.O. Box 751
San Anselmo, CA 94979
cc: Eric M. Lieberman, Esq.
Michael Lee Hertzberg, Esq.
Bowies & Moxon
Toby L. Plevin, Esq.