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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
Civ. No. B 038975
(Super. Ct. No. C420153)

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA
and MARY SUE HUBBARD,

Appellants,

-against-

GERALD ARMSTRONG,

Defendant.

BENT CORYDON,

Appellee.

Appeal from Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Judge Bruce R. Geernaert

APPELLANTS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO FILE
RESPONSE AND FOR TIME TO FILE

Defendant Gerald Armstrong, who did not participate in

the proceedings below upon which these appeals are based and who

tank no appeal from the underlying orders below, has sought

leave for permission to file a brief herein and for an extension

of 60 days in which to do so. Defendant's petition for leave

should be denied, for the reasons stated below:

-1-

1. This appeal and cross-appeal are from orders of

the Superior Court below granting in part and denying in part

the applications of Bent Corydon to unseal the file in this

case. The file in this case was sealed pursuant to a settlement

agreement and stipulation entered into, through counsel, by the

plaintiffs Church of Scientology of California and Mary Sue

Hubbard, on the one hand, and the defendant, Gerald Armstrong,

on the other hand. As set forth in the appellants' briefs

herein, the sealing of the file was an essential part of the

settlement agreement, pursuant to which Mr. Armstrong received a

substantial sum of money in settlement of his cross-complaint.

Mr. Armstrong thereby explicitly agreed to, and

thereby waived any objection to, the sealing of the file herein.

He has no recognizable interest in the outcome of this appeal.

2. Mr. Armstrong's counsel of record in this case was

informed and aware of the proceedings below initiated by Mr.

Corydon. Counsel for appellants, indeed, mailed complete sets

of all such papers to Mr. Armstrong's counsel. Mr. Armstrong,

through his counsel, did trot participate in the proceedings

below, and chose not to notice an appeal from any of the orders

entered below.

Mr. Armstrong did file a pleading in this Court

objecting to the inclusion of certain exhibits to a document

filed by Mr. Corydon on December 23, 1988, and asking this Court

to seal those exhibits. Significantly, in his pleading Mr.

Armstrong supported the position of the appellants herein,

stating: "Numerous materials in the Armstrong case filed [sic]

-2-

were sealed at the behest of both parties as part of the

settlement of the case. That sealing was an intrical [sic] part

of the settlement, which settlement should not be undone."

This appeal thereafter has proceeded with full

briefing by the parties, the last brief having been filed on

January 18, 1990. Now, over one month later, Mr. Armstrong

seeks 60 days to file a brief in a proceeding over which he has

exhibited little concern and asserted no legal interest, other

than to maintain the seal on the file. In seeking such relief,

Mr. Armstrong has apparently fired his counsel of record and is

purportedly proceeding pro se, while stating that he hopes to

retain new counsel in the future.

Mr. Amstrong has provided no reasons why he should be

permitted to delay the proceedings in this appeal at this late

date. He has not identified what interests he wishes to assert.

He has not stated why he did not instruct his attorneys of

record to file or seek to file a brief at the proper stages of

this appeal.

Mr. Armstrong's request should he denied because of

his failure to participate or assert an interest in the

proceedings below, because he has waived whatever interest he

may have, and because his application is untimely.

3. Mr. Armstrong further states that he is barred

from filing a brief by the settlement agreement which he entered

into in this case. Mr. Armstrong did waive the right to file

any further briefs in opposition to positions asserted by the

appellants arising out of this case. He did so freely and in

-3-

substantial settlement of his cross-complaint. He has stated no

reason to be relieved from his prior agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Armstrong's

"petition" should be denied in all respects.

Dated: March 6, 1990

-4-

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